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Footnotes 
1 ????????????????????s currently the agenda for socio-economic development of the European Union. 
It was adopted by the European Council of Lisbon in 2000 and it is reshaping many of the Community 
policies as well as being translated into National Reform programmes in all Memb???????????????????
Agenda Group 2007). 
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Agency and Structure:  
A social simulation of knowledge-intensive industries 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Modern knowledge-intensive economies are complex social systems where intertwining factors are responsible 
for the shaping of emerging industries: the self-organising interaction patterns and strategies of the individual 
actors (an agency-oriented pattern) and the institutional frameworks of different innovation systems (a structure-
oriented pattern). In this paper, we examine the relative primacy of the two patterns in the development of 
innovation networks, and find that both are important.  In order to investigate the relative significance of 
strategic decision making by innovation network actors and the roles played by national institutional settings, we 
use an agent-based model of knowledge-intensive innovation networks, SKIN. We experiment with the 
simulation of different actor strategies and different access conditions to capital in order to study the resulting 
effects on innovation performance and size of the industry. Our analysis suggests that actors are able to 
compensate for structural limitations through strategic collaborations.  The implications for public policy are 
outlined.  
 
K eywords: innovation networks, agent-based social simulation, innovation systems 
 
1. Introduction 
 
?????????? ????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????? ??? ????????? ???????????? ???
competitiveness and employment, Research, Technology and Development (RTD) 
and innovation are critical among them as they affect companies' long term capacity 
to stay in the market as active players, to maintain and renew their range of products 
and services and ultimately to create conditions for sustainable employment. The 
demands on and expectations from RTD policies to deliver on competitiveness and 
*Blind Manuscript
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 2 
employment have ?????? ????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????????? ??? ???? ?????????
Communities 2002: 13). 
In Europe´s knowledge-based economies the mechanisms of knowledge creation and 
utilisation have been changing, with an increasing emphasis on the formation of 
innovation networks, that is, networks which connect innovative firms, government 
agencies, research institutes and sources of venture capital. Economic sociology and 
new innovation economics consider the growing complexity of knowledge, the 
accelerating pace of knowledge creation, and the shortening of industry life cycles to 
be responsible for the rising importance of innovation networks (e.g. Powell et al. 2005, 
Eliasson 1995). Knowledge-intensive industries such as information and 
communication technologies (ICT) a??? ?????????????? ???????????? ????? ????????
undergone structural changes in the direction of these collective modes of knowledge 
production and application. Emerging industries, such as those based on new 
materials and nanotechnologies as well as knowledge-based services, are also 
developing along these lines. Combining knowledge resources in social networks 
enables innovation and learning that are difficult to provide by other means. 
Decreasing risks by distributing them to network members and accessing financial 
funds for the capital needed in product development are additional motives in these 
industries.  
 
These changes are reflected in the social sciences: although the institutional approach 
in economics has already introduced a sociological perspective to mainstream 
economic theory, sociologists such as Granovetter (1985) and others have criticised 
the approach, arguing that actual markets are shaped by social factors to a much 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ????????????????????????? only to 
the fact that real markets rely on the co-
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 3 
on the institutional regulations that frame the interactions of traders, but also to the 
social role of the networks of collaborations and contracts that are an integral part of 
most markets.  
The changes are occurring throughout the world. For example, a comparison of the 
current structures and dynamics of UK and German biotechnology-based industries 
reveals a striking convergence of industrial structure and the directions of innovation 
in both countries (reference to authors). This counteracts propositions from 
conventional neo-institutionalist frameworks such as the varieties-of-capitalism 
hypothesis and the national innovation systems approach which suggest that there 
are substantial differences between the industrial structures of European countries 
due to differing institutional frameworks (cf. Casper and Kettler 2001). The observed 
structural alignment can be explained by the network organisation of research and 
production in knowledge-based industries.  
 
?????????????? ????? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ???? ? ????????? ??? ??????????? ?????????? ???? ????
start of the twenty-first century the role of institutions and the conditions for 
institutional change are at the core of ?????????????????????????????????????????????
1). There is strong empirical evidence (cf. Amable 2003, Casper and van Waarden 
2006) that institutional framework conditions shape the structure and dynamics of 
societies: each national society has developed a context and a path dependent 
institutional infrastructure (politics, law, economy, culture) and, because economic 
action is strongly influenced by these specific infrastructures, this leads to differences 
in national industrial performance. However, in knowledge-intensive industries the 
structures of industrial R&D organization in different countries are tending to 
converge, triggered by the particular challenges of knowledge generation and 
diffusion. 
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Modern knowledge-intensive economies are complex social systems where 
intertwining factors are responsible for the shaping of emerging industries: the self-
organising interaction patterns and strategies of the individual actors (an agency-
oriented pattern) and the institutional frameworks of different innovation systems (a 
structure-oriented pattern). Policy is changing from a neo-liberal model (based on 
improving institutions for financing and technology transfer) towards a so-called 
?????? ??????????? ???????? ?????? ??????? ????????? ???? ????????? ???-linear, 
interdependent, and adaptive features of social systems.    
 
Economic sociology tries to capture these complex features while being aware of the 
pitfalls of an agency-structure dichotomy. The agency-oriented pattern is put in focus 
????????????????????????? ??is to illuminate how patterns of interaction emerge, take 
root, and transform, with ramifications for all of the participants. We develop 
arguments concerning how the topology of a network and the rules of attachment 
among its constituents guide the choice of partners and shape the trajectory of the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????? communities of organisations that engage in common activities 
and are subject to similar reputational and regulatory pressures defining them as 
networks of relations between positions. 
 
For Powell et al., the dynamics of innovation networks, which they define as interaction 
patterns between two or more actors, can explain how fields evolve. They relate the 
behaviour and dynamics of the entire structure to the properties of its constituents and 
their interactions: individual firms learn how to collaborate with a very heterogeneous 
set of partners. Field evolution can be explained by the mechanisms for partner 
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 5 
selection (Powell et al. 2005: 7f). The strategic decisions of the networking actors and 
their engagement in different learning activities are responsible for the shaping of the 
industry. The focus is on representing the agency of innovative actors who are located 
in an institutional framework, on the interactions of participants and the emerging 
network dynamics and thus on the evolution of the industrial field.  
 
In contrast, structure-oriented patterns of explanation emphasise the important role 
played by the specific national institutional settings for the innovative performance of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
thesis states, national industries do look different.  Each formation can offer a 
particular comparative institutional advantage, enabling economic success within the 
different national frameworks (Hall and Soskice 2001). VoC studies (Petit and 
??????? ?????? ??????? ?????? ???????????? ???? ???????????? ???????? ????????? ???????
??????????? ?????? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???-?????????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ???
Germany). The differences are traced back to national regulations of labour and 
corporate law, to institutional differences in the development of competences and 
knowledge transfer, and to differences in financial systems, e.g. the availability of 
venture capital and public funding for start-ups. Differentiating, elaborating and 
complementing the focus on framework conditions, recent research has targeted 
sectoral systems of innovation (Malerba 2002), regional innovation systems (Cooke 
and Morgan 1998) and local technology clusters (Feldman et al. 2005).  
 
Just as Powell et al. are well aware of the field constraints and framework conditions 
working on and in agency-oriented patterns, framework theorists are sensitive to the 
importance of an actor-centered view.  According to Beije (1998: 256), an innovation 
???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?esearch institutes, and 
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 6 
several of the facilitators of innovation, who in interaction promote the creation of one 
or a number of technological innovations [within a framework of] institutions which 
promote or facilitate the diffusion or application of these technological innova?????????? 
 
Bourdieu offers an elaborated operationalisation of the structure-oriented pattern. For 
him, it is the structures and the constraints of the field which enable and limit 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and effectiveness, on their position in the field of forces, that is to say, in the structure 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is not only financial capital but all the resources an actor can draw upon, e.g. 
technological, financial, commercial, social and symbolic capital. The changing 
distribution and (re-)combination of capital in this sense ? the field ? is responsible for 
???? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????? ????? ?????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????? ?????? ??? ????
interactionist vision, which is, by virtue of the representation of the agent as a 
calculating atom, able to cohabit with the mechanistic vision, and according to which 
the economic and social order can be reduced to a host of interacting individuals, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? (Bourdieu 2005: 197). 
 
 
2. Social simulation 
 
Untangling the various relationships posited by Bourdieu, Powell et al. and other 
commentators is particularly difficult because of the nature of the phenomenon: 
innovative industrial sectors are by definition constantly changing.  Tracking the 
influence of particular characteristics is most effectively done with an experimental 
design, yet, as with most matters of sociological interest, direct experiments are 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 7 
impossible, impracticable or unethical.  Moreover, most renderings of innovation 
theory are vague and incomplete, making testing doubly difficult. 
 
Agent-based social simulation can come to the rescue.  Agent-based simulation 
enforces the precise articulation of theory and enables a dynamic representation of 
theories and empirical knowledge about innovative actors and their networking 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
software theories about the attributes, properties and actions of empirical actors. 
Each agent in such a system is autonomous, pro-active, reactive, able to interact, 
able to learn, and has an individual state depending on context, situation, and time. 
Agent-based models are usually based on a set of autonomous agents capable of 
interacting with each other as well as with the environment according to pre-specified 
rules of behaviour. From the interaction on the micro-level emerge macro-level 
features as system properties. ?????????????? ??? ?????? ??? ???????????? ????????? ??? ????
computer to carry out the experiments that we would have liked to perform in the 
empirical world. We can observe the dynamic processing of our theories, using, as 
???????? ??????? ????? ?????? ??? ????? ??? ???????? ??????????? ???? ???????? ????????? ??????????
???????? ??? ??? ??????????rtificial data that resemble those we observe empirically this 
gives some indication of the quality, consistency and completeness of our theories 
and interpretations of complex interaction patterns. Thus, agent-based simulation 
offers new opportunities to investigate the relationships between variables describing 
complex scenarios that would not be possible using more conventional methods. 
 
To model knowledge-?????????? ???????????? ??? ??????? ???? ????? ??? ????????-??????????
modelling:  
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History-friendly models are formal models which aim to capture - in stylized 
form - qualitative theories about mechanisms and factors affecting industry 
evolution, technological advance and institutional change put forth by empirical 
research in industrial organization, in business organization and strategy, and 
in the histories of industries. They present empirical evidence and suggest 
powerful explanations. Usually these "histories" are very rich and detailed. 
Actors and variables like the educational system, policies, institutions, the 
internal organizational structure of firms, the structure of demand play a 
fundamental role in these accounts. Modeling the history of industry 
necessarily implies a more rigorous dialogue with empirical evidence and with 
non-formal explanations of those histories, i.e. with "appreciative theorizing". 
This is particularly relevant because many explanations used in historical 
analysis are so rich and complex that only a simulation model can capture (at 
least in part) the substance, above all when verbal explanations imply non-
linear dynamics (Malerba et al. 1999: 3-4). 
 
The agent-based simulation SKIN models the trading of firms and their changing 
knowledge levels within knowledge-intensive industries. SKIN is grounded in 
empirical research and theoretical frameworks from innovation economics and 
economic sociology. The agents represent innovative firms who try to sell their 
innovations to other agents and end users but who also have to buy raw materials or 
more sophisticated inputs from other agents (or material suppliers) in order to produce 
their outputs. This basic model of a market is extended with a representation of the 
knowledge dynamics in and between the firms. Each firm tries to improve its innovation 
performance and its sales by improving its knowledge base through adaptation to user 
needs, incremental or radical learning, and co-operation and networking with other 
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 9 
agents. This section will describe the elements and processes of this model (refences 
to authors). The SKIN model is the result of a number of projects that combined 
empirical research into innovation networks with agent-based simulation1.  
 
 
                                                          
1 This ????? ???????? ????? ???? ??? ???????? ??? ????ing self-organising Innovation 
?????????? ???????? ????? ???????? ????????? ????? ?????????? ????? ???????? ??? ??????????
sectors of technological innovation and in different EU member states with agent-
based simulation of these case studies. The results of the SEIN project are 
summarised in Pyka and Kueppers (2003). Case studies described knowledge-
intensive European industry sectors such as the biotechnology-based pharmaceutical 
industry in France (Pyka and Saviotti 2003), combined heat and power technology 
networks in The Netherlands, Germany and the UK (Weber 2003), knowledge-
intensive business services in the UK web design industry (Windrum 2003), and the 
UK Virtual Centre of Excellence in the European telecommunication industry 
(reference to authors 2003). The task of the SEIN project was threefold: theory 
formation, empirical case studies, and agent-based simulation. The objective was to 
derive a theory of innovation networks from insights derived inductively from the case 
studies and to implement this theory of innovation networks into an agent-based 
model1. The result of the modelling activities was an agent-based model ? based on 
empirical research and informed by empirical data coming from the case studies 
(reference to authors). The model was used by the European Commission for 
scenario modelling of current and future innovation policy strategies (reference to 
authors) referring to the technological sectors and EU Member States of the case 
studies.  
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The current SKIN model builds on the procedures we implemented for biotechnology-
based pharmaceuticals in Europe using this sector as an example par excellence of a 
knowledge-intensive industry. Therefore, when showing in more detail how the model 
procedures are rooted in empirical research, we will focus on this industrial sector 
specifically. The empirical work2 is summarised in reference to authors (2006). The 
model is concerned with representing the agency of innovative actors within an 
institutional framework: network dynamics arise from the interaction of firms, and field 
evolution can be observed on the industry level.  
 
In experimenting with the simulation we are able to investigate the influences of 
agency-oriented and structure-oriented patterns on the agent population. We can 
show and measure the influence of the interaction and the strategies of the individual 
actors (agency-oriented pattern) and the influence of structural features evolving 
through the ever changing knowledge and capital distribution opening up new 
opportunities for actors or limiting their action space (structure-oriented pattern). In 
the rest of this section we introduce the model. In section 3 we summarise what we 
learnt from the SKIN model through experimenting with agency-oriented and 
structure-oriented patterns of industry evolution.  First, the elements and processes 
of the model are described in more detail. 
 
2.1 The agents 
 
????????????????? ???????????????????? ????? ???????????????? ?????????????????????????
????? ????? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ?????????? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ??????????
                                                          
2 !"#$%$&'()%*+*'%&,)-.%)%*-$/$/0)1,*)2345)#%.&*67%*+),'+)8**/)&./67&1*6)$/)1,*)8$9/'1$./'()%*+*'%&,)
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????9
????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 11 
(procedures, aptitudes, routines and unique and coherent know-how, capable of 
reducing expenditure in labour or capital or increasing its yield) that can be deployed 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ??? ???? ??????????? ?????????? ????? ??? ?? ?????? ??? ??? ??????? ???? ?????s kene 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????? ??? ?? ??????? ??????????? ??? ?? ??????? capability C in a scientific, 
technological or business domain (e.g. biochemistry), represented by an integer 
randomly chosen from the range of 1..1000, its ability A to perform a certain 
application in this field (e.g. a synthesis procedure or filtering technique in the field of 
biochemistry), represented by an integer randomly chosen from the range 1..10 and 
the expertise level E the firm has achieved with respect to this ability (represented by 
an integer randomly chosen from the range 1..10). The firm's kene is its collection of 
C/A/E-triples (figure 1). 
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 1
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 1
, ,..., ,..., ,..., , ...
n
n
n
n
n
C C C C C
A A A A A
E E E E E
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 
Figure 1: The kene of an agent 
 
Firms apply their knowledge to create innovative products that have a chance to be 
successful in the market. The special focus of a firm, its potential innovation, is called 
an innovation hypothesis. In the model, the innovation hypothesis (IH) consists of a 
s?????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ????????? ? ????? ????? ??????? ????? ?? ?????? ??? ???????? ??????????
capital, ?????? ?????????????????? ???????????????????? ?????????? ????????????????????? ????
main condition (together with time) for the accumulation and conservation of all other 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
market and to improve its knowledge base, and it can increase its capital by selling 
products.  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 12 
 
2.2 The market 
 
Because actors in empirical innovation networks of knowledge-intensive industries 
interact on both the knowledge and the market levels (cf. Garcia et al. forthcoming b: 
2), we need a representation of market dynamics in the SKIN model. Agents are 
therefore characterised by their capital stock. Each firm, when it is set up, has a stock 
of initial capital. It needs this capital to produce for the market and to finance its R&D 
expenditures; it can increase its capital by selling products. The amount of capital 
owned by a firm is used as a measure of its size and additionally influences the 
amount of knowledge (measured by the number of triples in its kene) that it can 
maintain. In many knowledge-intensive industries we find the co-existence of large 
and small actors (e.g. the large pharmaceutical firms and biotech start-ups, and the 
former national monopolists and high technology specialists in the ICT industries, cf. 
Pyka and Saviotti 2005). We assume that large diversified firms are characterised by 
a larger knowledge base as compared with smaller specialised companies (cf. 
Brusoni et al. 2001). Most firms are initially given the same starting capital allocation, 
but in order to model differences in firm size, a few randomly chosen firms can be 
allocated significant extra capital to represent the large companies.  
Firms apply their knowledge to create innovative products that have a chance of 
?????? ??????????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ??????
??????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ? ??? ??? ????????? ??? ?????? ?????? ????? ??????????????
activity is carried out, and it is specific to products and processes, since most of the 
expenditures is not on research, but on development and production engineering, 
after which knowledge is also accumulated through experience in production and use 
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on what has come to ?????????????????????-by-????????????????????-by-????????????????
1987: 9).  
 
The underlying idea for an innovation, modelled by the innovation hypothesis (IH), is 
the source an agent uses for its attempts to make profits in the market. Because of 
the fundamental uncertainty of innovation (Knight 1921), there is no simple 
relationship between the innovation hypothesis and product development. To 
represent this uncertainty, we developed the following mechanism: the innovation 
hypothesis is transformed into the simulation of a product through a mapping 
procedure where the capabilities of the innovation hypothesis are used to compute 
an index number that represents the product. The particular transformation procedure 
applied allows the same product to result from different kenes, which is not too far 
from reality where the production technologies of firms within a single industry can 
vary considerably (Winter 1984). 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
?
! ? ! "#"#$% $
%&
?
 
(1) 
(where N is a constant representing the maximum number of different possible 
products). 
 
A product has a certain quality, which is also computed from the innovation 
hypothesis in a similar way, by multiplying the abilities and the expertise levels for 
each triple in the innovation hypothesis and normalising the result. In order to realise 
the product, the agent needs some materials.  These can either come from outside 
???? ??????? ?????? ???????????? ??? ????? ?????? ??????? ?????? ?????????? ????? ??? ??????
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products. Which materials are needed is also determined by the underlying 
innovation hypothesis: the kind of material required for an input is obtained by 
selecting subsets from the innovation hypothesis and applying the standard mapping 
function (equation 1).  
 
These inputs are chosen ??? ????? ????? ??? ?????????? ???? ???????? ????? ???? ??????? ????
product. In order to be able to engage in production, all the inputs need to be 
obtainable on the market, i.e. provided by other firms or available as raw materials. If 
the inputs are not available, the firm is not able to produce and has to give up this 
attempt to innovate. If there is more than one supplier for a certain input, the agent 
will choose the one at the cheapest price and, if there are several similar offers, the 
one with the highest quality.   
 
If the firm can go into production, it has to find a price for its product, taking into 
account the input prices it is paying and a possible profit margin. While the simulation 
starts with product prices set at random, as the simulation proceeds a price 
adjustment mechanism following a standard mark-up pricing model increases the 
selling price if there is much demand, and reduces it (but no lower than the total cost 
of production) if there are no customers.  Some products are considered to be 
desti???? ???? ???? ????-?????? ???? ???? ????? ??? ?????????? ???????? ???? ???????? ?????? ???
always a demand for such end-user products provided that they are offered at or 
below a fixed end-user price. A firm buys the requested inputs from its suppliers 
using its capital to do so, produces its output and puts it on the market for others to 
purchase. Using the price adjustment mechanism, agents are able to adapt their 
prices to demand and in doing so learn by feedback.  
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In making a product, a firm applies the knowledge in its innovation hypothesis and 
this increases its expertise in this area. This is the way that learning by doing/using is 
modelled. The expertise levels of the triples in the innovation hypothesis are 
increased and the expertise levels of the other triples are decremented. Expertises in 
unused triples in the kene are eventually lost and the triples are then deleted from the 
?????? ???? ?????????????? ?????????? ???? ???????????? ??? ???????????? ????? ????? ????????
1981). 
 
Thus, in trying to be successful in the market, firms are dependent on their innovation 
hypotheses, i.e. on their kenes. If a product does not meet any demand, the firm has 
to adapt its knowledge in order to produce something else for which there are 
customers (cf. e.g. Duncan 1974). A firm has several ways of improving its 
performance, either alone or in co-operation, and in either an incremental or a more 
radical fashion.  
 
 
2.3 Learning and co-operation: improving innovation performance 
 
In an earlier publication (reference to authors 2007), we showed how these learning 
features of the SKIN model are theoretically grounded in the body of literature known 
??? ???????????????? ?????????? ?????? ?????? ????? (1938) introduced the concept of 
experiential learning as a permanent activity cycle and started a discussion among 
educationalists about feedback learning and learning by doing, Michael (1973) 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Organizational Learning (1978; newly edited including further work as Organizational 
Learning II, 1996) proposed that a learning organisation is one that is permanently 
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changing its interpretation of the environment. In doing so, the organisation learns 
new things and forgets old ones. Drawing on their background as action theorists, 
Argyris and Schön show how these interpretations are gained and how they are 
connected to different organisational behaviours. They distinguish between three 
types of learning, rooting them in an understanding of organisational agency that 
targets growth and effectiveness: 
? Single-loop learning: This is adjustment learning, referring to the rational use of 
???????????????????? ???????????? ?????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
set of organisational goals, strategies and behaviours. It targets an improvement of 
???? ???????? ????????????????????????????????????? ??????????-outcome feedback and 
???????????????????????????? ?????????????? ??? ?????????? 
? Double-loop learning: This is turnover learning with respect to the meta-level of 
goals, strategies, and behaviours of an organisation, and aims to adapt them to 
environmental requirements. The learning process includes un-learning of redundant 
knowledge to clear space for new behaviours. Furthermore, co-operation, including 
assumption and benefit sharing with collaborators, is seen as a vehicle for learning. 
? Deutero learning: This is meta-level learning of the highest order where the 
organisation reflects on its own identity. Here, the learning process itself is the object 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to critique and change.    
 
The SKIN model takes many of the ideas of the Argyris and Schön framework and 
uses them to examine the assumption that, in the words of de Geus (1997), the 
greatest competitive advantage for any firm is its ability to learn. Experiments 
concerning the effects of different combinations of learning activities on the agent 
population are reported in  (reference to authors 2007). In the SKIN model, firms 
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predominantly engage in single- and double-loop learning activities. Deutero learning 
may appear when new agents intentionally are created by collaborating actors due to 
the success of the network. 
 
In respect of single loop learning, firm agents can: 
? use their capabilities (learning by doing/using) and learn to estimate their success via 
feedback from markets and clients (learning by feedback) as already mentioned 
above 
? improve their own knowledge incrementally when the feedback is not satisfactory in 
order to adapt to changing technological and/or economic standards (adaptation 
learning, incremental learning) 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
will continue selling the same product in the next round, possibly at a different price 
depending on the demand it has experienced. However, if there were no sales, it 
considers that it is time for change. If the firm still has enough capital, it will carry out 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ch (cf. 
Cohen and Levinthal 1989) means that a firm tries to improve its product by altering 
one of the abilities chosen from the triples in its innovation hypothesis, while sticking 
to its focal capabilities. The ability in each triple is considered to be a point in the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Alternatively, firms can radically change their capabilities in order to meet completely 
different client requirements (innovative learning, radical learning). A SKIN firm agent 
under serious pressure and in danger of becoming bankrupt, will turn to more radical 
measures, by exploring a completely different area of market opportunities. In the 
model, an agent under financial pressure turns to a new innovation hypothesis after 
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?????? ????????????????????????????? ???? ???? ??????????? ??????????? ????????? ????????????
capability in the kene with a new one and then generating a new innovation 
hypothesis.  
 
Firms may also be also active on the double-loop learning level of the model. They 
can: 
 
? forget their capabilities (clean up their knowledge space) 
? decide on their individual learning strategies themselves (e.g. incremental or radical 
learning), constructing and changing the strategies according to their past experience 
and current context.  The context consists of external factors such as the actions of 
clients, competitors and partners and the availability of technical options, and internal 
factors such as their capital stock and the competencies available to them 
? engage in networking and partnerships to absorb and exploit external knowledge 
sources, to imitate and emulate, and to use synergy effects (participative learning).  
  
An agent in the model may consider partnerships (alliances, joint ventures etc.) in 
order to exploit external knowledge sources. The decision whether and with whom to 
co-operate is based on the mutual observations of the firms, which estimate the 
chances and requirements coming from competitors, possible and past partners, and 
clients. Bolton, Katoka and Ockenfels (2005), writing from a theoretical viewpoint, 
and Mitchelet (1992), using empirical evidence, both show that greater mutual 
information, where firms know thei?? ?????????? ???????? ??? ????????????? ? ??????? ????
conditions for cooperation. In the SKIN model, a marketing feature provides the 
information that a firm can gather about other agents: to advertise its product, a firm 
publishes the capabilities used in its innovation hypothesis. Those capabilities not 
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included in its innovation hypothesis and thus in its product are not visible externally 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the basis for decisions by other firms to form or reject co-operative arrangements. 
In experimenting with the model, we can choose between two different partner 
??????? ??????????? ???????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ??? ?????? ???????? ???? ??????? ????
capabilities as used in its innovation hypothesis an?? ???? ????????? ??????????
capabilities as seen in its advertisement. Applying the conservative strategy, a firm 
will be attracted to a partner that has similar capabilities; using a progressive strategy 
the attraction is based on the difference between the capability sets.  
 
Previously good experience with former contacts generally augurs well for renewing a 
partnership. For example, Garcia´s et al. findings concerning the interaction patterns 
between public research centres and industrial firms confirm that ??????? ???????
?????????????? ???? ?? ???????????? ???????? ???? ??????????????? ??????? ????? ??????
relationships) appear to be more fundamental in building university-????????? ??????
(Garcia et al. forthcoming a: 2f). This is mirrored in the model: to find a partner, the 
firm will look at previous partners first, then at its suppliers, customers and finally at 
all others. If there is a firm sufficiently attractive according to the chosen search 
????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???? ???????????????? ??????????), it will stop its 
search and offer a partnership. If the potential partner wishes to return the 
partnership offer, the partnership is set up.  
 
The model assumes that partners learn only about the knowledge being actively 
used by the other agent. Thus, to learn from a partner, a firm will add the triples of the 
?????????? ??????????? ??????????? ??? ???? ????? ???? ????????????? ????? ???? ???? ??? ???? ????
expertise levels of the triples taken from the partner are reduced in order to mirror the 
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difficulty of integrating external knowledge as stated in empirical learning research 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
that are already known to it, if the partner has a higher expertise level, the firm will 
drop its own triple ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
is lower, the firm will stick to its own version. Once the knowledge transfer has been 
completed, each firm continues to produce its own product, possibly with greater 
expertise as a result of acquiring skills from its partner. 
 
??? ??????????? ????? ??????????????????????????? ????? ????????????? ??????????? ??? ?????????????
round was above a threshold, and the firm has some partners at hand, it can initiate 
the formation of a network. A network of firms in the biotechnology-based 
pharmaceutical sector often forms an independent legal entity.  An example is 
Genostar, a French bio-informatics company which emerged from a public-private 
innovation network between the Institut Pasteur, INRIA (French National Institute for 
Research in Computer Science and Control), and the firms Genome Express, and 
Hybrigenics.3 The formation of a legal entity enables actions and exploits advantages 
that are only available to companies and can be considered as a particular form of 
deutero learning. This is why networks are autonomous agents in the SKIN model. Of 
course, the participating members stay autonomous agents themselves and thus 
have a chance for double profit: the distributed rewards if the network is successful, 
and the returns they get from their own successful innovation projects that they 
undertake outside of the network. 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
firms and can engage in all the activities available to other firms. The kene of a 
                                                          
3 See http://www.genostar.com/en/about-genostar/history1.html 
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network is the union of the triples from the innovation hypotheses of all its 
participants. If a network is successful it will distribute any earnings above the 
amount of the initial capital to its members; if it fails and becomes bankrupt, it will be 
dissolved.  
 
2.4 Start-ups 
 
If a sector is successful, new firms will be attracted into it representing 
Schumpeterian competition by imitation. This is modelled by adding a new firm to the 
population when any existing firm makes a substantial profit. The new firm is a clone 
of the successful firm, but with its kene triples both restricted to those in the 
????????????????????????????????????set to a low expertise level. This models a new 
firm copying the characteristics of those seen to be successful in the market. As with 
all firms, the kene may also be restricted because the initial capital of a start-up is 
limited and may not be sufficient to support the copying of the whole of the successful 
???????????????????????????s. 
 
 
 
3. Agency and structure: the experiments 
 
To test our research question about the relative importance of the structure and the 
agency orientations, we perform numerical experiments with opposing conditions for 
the initial distribution and the strategic orientation of actors. This research strategy 
highlights the twofold advantages agent-based modelling offers for this kind of 
analysis: on the one hand, this strict distinguishing between the two scenarios can 
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never be achieved empirically. On the other hand, the ABM allows for the simulation 
and investigation of a wide range of factors concerning innovation performance, 
knowledge development etc. although they are empirically not or only incompletely 
available for analysis. 
 
In experimenting with the SKIN model we compare an agency-oriented scenario and 
a structure-oriented scenario using two dependent variables, the innovative success 
of the sector and its size, measured by the number of firms in the sector.  
 
Within the agency-oriented scenario, we test whether the strategic collaboration 
decisions of actors are responsible for the shaping of the sector (size and innovative 
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the number of firms if 
 
a) firms decide against strategic collaboration, i.e. neither form partnerships nor 
networks, or 
b) use different mechanisms of partner choice. 
 
If the simulation experiments suggest a positive answer to both questions this 
supports a perspective which claims the primacy of an agency-oriented pattern in 
industry formation. Then, the strategic collaboration decisions of actors, i.e. their 
interaction patterns, could be responsible for the shaping of the field. 
. 
To operationalise (a), we switch off the ability of firms to collaborate; to operationalise 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ???? ???????????? ????????????? ????????? ??????? ??????????????? ???????? ???????
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strategy as the only mechanism available for partner-seeking firms. Within these 
scenarios we test the influence of our changes on the innovative performance 
?????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and on the sector size measured by the number of firms remaining in the population 
after a ??????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Within the structure-oriented scenario, we ask whether structural features determine 
the options and limitations of actors and therefore shape the sector. The permanently 
changing distribution and (re)combi??????? ??? ?????? ??? ???????? ???????????? ????????? ???
used to represent structural conditions (availability of funding and venture capital, 
availability of human resources, technology and knowledge transfer institutions etc.).  
 
Here, we ask whether it makes any difference for the success of the sector and the 
number of firms if 
 
a) all firms initially have the same capital available to them or 
b) firms differ greatly in owning various kinds of capital  
 
If the simulation experiments show that this indeed makes a significant difference, the 
claim of a structure-oriented pattern of sector formation is supported. Then, chances 
and constraints of the field, i.e. its structure, could be responsible for the shaping of 
the sector in terms of size and innovative performance. 
 
To operationalise (a) in the structure-oriented scenario, we distribute all capital 
equally between the agents. To operationalise (b), the number of big firms 
(represented in the model as having ten times the amount of technological and 
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financial capital of the remaining firms) is varied (independent variable called 
???????????????? ? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ???????????
performance and on sector size.  
 
Two regression models are estimated to measure the influence of the independent 
variables (uniformsize, conservative, progressive) on the number of innovations (I) 
and on the size of the sector (N). Table 1 details the results of the regressions based 
on 10 simulation runs, each lasting 200 time steps, at the end of which the number of 
innovations and the number of firms were counted4. We chose time = 200 as the 
stopping point because at that time the simulation system is "warmed up" sufficiently 
to show us the effect of different collaboration strategies. 
 
 Regression results 
 
 
 
 I (number of innovations) N (number of firms) 
 Regression 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
ß-values Regression 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
ß-values 
Intercept 8682 62.660  367 32.718  
Uniformsize -117* -8.501 -0.595 -34* -3.048 -0.237 
Conservative 1476* 8.698 0.703 137* 9.977 0.895 
Progressive 811* 4.782 0.386 79* 5.814 0.522 
R2 0.726   0.662   
* coefficients are significant at the 5% level 
 
 
Table 1:  Estimates from regression models for the number of innovations and 
number of firms against the capital distribution (uniformsize) and partnering strategy 
(none; conservative; progressive). 
 
All coefficients are significant at the 5 per cent level. The table shows that if the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? the 
                                                          
4 We gratefully acknowledge the support of Michel Schilperoord in running and analysing the simulations.   
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innovative performance and the size of the sector is less than if the initial capital 
???????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
has a positive influence on both dependent variables, supporting the claims of the 
structure-oriented scenario.  Both the conservative or progressive partner choice 
mechanisms likewise have a positive influence on the dependent variables, as 
compared with no collaboration, with the conservative having more effect than the 
progressive. 
 
The results of the simulation experiments show that neither the agency-oriented 
scenario nor the structure-oriented scenario can claim primacy. On the one hand, the 
partner choice decisions of actors for strategic collaboration are significant for the 
innovative success and the size of the sector; on the other hand the capital distribution, 
i.e. the structure of the field, is also significant for both dependent variables.  In the 
world of the SKIN model, the two patterns both have an influence.  
 
These overall results can be examined in more detail by considering the mean levels 
of innovations and firms for specific settings of the independent variables.   
The box plots shows the results for simulation experiments for the three partnership 
strategies: no partners (experiment no. 1-5), conservative (6-10) and progressive (11-
15). Within each block, the number of big firms is increased from 0 to 300 in steps of 
75. 
 
Box plots 
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Table 2: Box plots showing the number of innovations and firms for various settings.  
Each experiment consisted of 10 runs, with the number of innovations and firms 
measured at the end of 200 timesteps. 
 Key: 
Experiment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
No. of big 
firms 
0 75 150 225 300 0 75 150 225 300 0 75 150 225 300 
Partner 
selection 
strategy 
No partners Conservative Progressive 
 
 
The results of the box plots show that scenarios with large firms always perform 
better than scenarios without large firms. Cooperation scenarios always (at least with 
respect to the mean) perform better than non-cooperative ones and progressive 
strategies perform less well than conservative strategies. 
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4. Conclusions - Impacts of modelling knowledge-intensive industries for 
European policy making 
 
Our result is reflected in efforts to overcome the agency-structure dichotomy. While 
focussing on partner choice mechanisms as a more agency-oriented pattern, Powell et 
al. (2005: 58) ????? ?????? ???? ???? ??? ???????? ???????? ???? ?asymmetric distribution of 
technological, organizational, and financial resources was a key factor in driving early 
?????????????? ????????????? ??? ???? ????????? showing that they do not under-estimate 
the influence of structural factors such as an unequal capital distribution. Bourdieu, in 
turn, while focussing on structure-oriented patterns in industry formation, emphasises 
the importance of agency that is enabled by structural embeddedness, e.g. for price 
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
without forgetting, however, that decisions are merely choices among possibles, 
defined, in their limits, by the structure of the field, and that actions owe their 
orientation and effectiveness to the structure of the objective relations between those 
engaging in them and those who are the objects of those actions?? ?????????? ??????
197). 
 
The mediating position which is supported by the simulation results suggests that 
actors are able to compensate for structural limitations through strategic collaboration 
and networking (reference to authors), improving their performance and success. The 
possibility of handling structural conditions creatively seems to be at the heart of any 
socio-economic change. And, vice versa, field constraints and structural features 
enable actors to act strategically within innovation processes. Agency and structure 
cannot compete on the grounds of primacy but their combinatorial relation is 
empirically and contextually located between institutional framework conditions, paths 
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and structures on the one hand, and creative (re)actions, new governance strategies 
and network formation of actors on the other hand. Socio-economic theory is required 
to provide the micro foundation of field structures as well as structure-theoretical 
embedding of intelligent autonomous actors. 
 
More work is now needed to understand the complex interplay between governance 
strategies targeting institutional framework conditions (the structure-oriented pattern) 
and governance strategies supporting collaboration and networking (the agency-
oriented pattern). Network policies in public funding schemes for collaborative R&D, 
knowledge creation and knowledge diffusion are one of the most important policy 
instruments used by the European Commission, national, and regional 
administrations to strengthen the scientific and technological knowledge base in 
Europe. This is acknowledged in many areas of European economic policy, 
stemming from the Lisbon agenda5.    
 
Strengthening collaboration among innovative actors in Europe is generally agreed to 
be a key element in improving the competitiveness of European science and industry 
and in creating the backbone of the European Research Area. To promote the 
knowledge-based economy in Europe will require the improvement of, on the one 
hand, the effectiveness and efficiency of network-based policy instruments facing 
self-organising network formation processes and, on the other, the institutional 
environment in which they take place, the most important component of which is the 
political governance regime.  
 
                                                          
5 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????-economic development of the European Union. It was 
adopted by the European Council of Lisbon in 2000 and it is reshaping many of the Community policies as well 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? 
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